Volume 20
Issue 1 Winter 1980
Winter 1980

Evaluating Alternative Compensation and Recapture Techniques
for Expanding Public Control of Land Use: A Comment
Johan B. W. Scholvinck

Recommended Citation
Johan B. Scholvinck, Evaluating Alternative Compensation and Recapture Techniques for Expanding
Public Control of Land Use: A Comment, 20 Nat. Resources J. 153 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol20/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION
AND RECAPTURE TECHNIQUES FOR
EXPANDED PUBLIC CONTROL OF LAND USE:
A COMMENT*
JOHAN B. W. SCHOLVINCK**

Of the three zoning schemes treated by Ervin and Fitch' -transfer
of development rights (TDR), zoning by eminent domain (ZED) and
zoning auctions (ZA)-it is the ZA which most truly reflects the
efficiency criterion of welfare economics. That is, if the bids of the
proponents exceed the bids of the opponents of the zoning change,
then it is possible to accomplish either a Pareto improvement or a
potential Pareto improvement. 2 Present zoning practice involves, at
least theoretically, a potential Pareto improvement, since actual compensation does not take place but the general welfare presumably is
enhanced. The appeal of the ZA lies in the fact that the possibility of
a potential Pareto improvement is transformed into an actual Pareto
improvement.
Ervin and Fitch, by following Wiseman's approach to the bidding
technique,3 approach the efficiency criterion incorrectly. Like Wiseman, Ervin and Fitch state that the proponents of zoning will bid an
amount of money they are willing to pay to have zoning, while the
opponents of zoning will bid an amount they are willing to pay to
prevent zoning from occurring. In other words, both proponents and
opponents state the maximum amounts they are willing to pay for
having or not having the zoning change. This is an incorrect way of
measuring a Pareto improvement. Using Mishan's approach to measuring exact compensation, 4 it can be shown that in measuring a
Pareto improvement one compares a maximum willingness to pay
*Comment on: Ervin & Fitch, EvaluatingAlternative Compensation and Recapture Techniques for Expanded Public Control of Land Use, 19 NAT. RES. J. 21 (1979).
**Department of Environmental Resources, Cook College, Rutgers-The State University
of New Jersey.
1. Ervin & Fitch, Evaluating Alternative Compensation and Recapture Techniques for
Expanded Public Control of Land Use, 19 NAT. RES J. 21 (1979).
2. A Pareto improvement is a change from a situation A to a situation B whereby at least
one person is made better off without making anyone else worse off. A potential Pareto
improvement is a change from a situation A to a situation B whereby those who gain can
compensate those who lose so that nobody is worse off than before and at least one person
is better off than before. A Pareto optimum is reached when nobody can be made better off
without making someone else worse off.

3. Wiseman, Rezoning by Auction-A New Approach to Land Use Decisions, UTAH SCI.
87, 88 (1974).
4. E. MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 125 (1971).
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with a minimum willingness to accept. Any other way of measurement is incorrect as the following example shows.
Suppose there are two individuals, A and B, living in adjacent
apartments. A enjoys playing his stereo. The noise of this stereo
interferes with B's meditation. B wants A to desist from playing his
stereo and offers A the maximum amount of money he is willing to
pay to obtain quiet. A will accept this amount only if he thinks it is
sufficient to compensate him for the loss of enjoyment he had received from playing his stereo. Clearly, if B's maximum willingness to
pay is at least equal to A's minimum willingness to accept, a Pareto
improvement can be achieved. Under this arrangement of compensation, B's willingness to pay and A's willingness to accept are compensating variations (CVs).
Now, assume that A learns of B's meditation habits and decides
not to play his stereo. Such action would increase B's welfare compared to the situation where A did play his stereo. However, in the
absence of A's promise to turn off his stereo, B would require a
certain minimum amount of compensation to make him as well off
as he would have been if A had indeed stopped playing his stereo.
This minimum amount acceptable to B is his equivalent variation
(EV). Similarly, if A had stopped playing his stereo, his welfare
would have been reduced. But since he is not doing so, his welfare is
actually increased compared to the situation where he would have
stopped playing. In other words, it is possible to exact a certain
maximum amount from A that would make him as well off as he
would have been if he had stopped playing his stereo. This maximum
amount paid by A is his EV.
In sum, the CV of A is the sum of money received by A which
maintains A's welfare at its original level when the event (no stereo
playing) takes place. The CV of B is the sum of money paid by B
which maintains B's welfare at its original level when the event takes
place. The EV of A is the sum of money paid by A which causes a
change in A's welfare that is equivalent to, and in lieu of, the event
(no stereo playing). The EV of B is the sum of money received by B
which causes a change in B's welfare that is equivalent to, and in lieu
of, the event in question.5
The only two proper ways to determine if a Pareto improvement
can occur is to compare either the CVs or the EVs of A and B. That
is, one compares a maximum willingness to pay with a minimum
willingness to accept. The compensation scheme used by Wiseman,
Ervin and Fitch is erroneous because only maxima are compared.
5. Id. at 129.
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Of these two measures it is only necessary to use the CV concept
to see if a Pareto improvement can take place. To show that this is
the case, let us assume that the economic change in question is the
event of zoning and that under existing law no such event can take
place.6 Now, those who will benefit from the zoning event are willing to pay a maximum amount to have the existing law changed to
allow zoning. This maximum amount is the proponents' CV. Those
who will suffer from the zoning change are willing to accept zoning
only if they are paid some minimum amount that will compensate
them for the loss they incur because of the change. This minimum
amount is the opponents' CV. If the maximum amount exceeds the
minimum amount, then a Pareto improvement is possible and the
change should take place. This approach is clearly different from
comparing the maximum amounts both proponents and opponents
of zoning are willing to pay. The maximum amount the opponents
are willing to pay to maintain the status quo (no-zoning) is not their
CV but their EV, because if the change occurred their welfare would
be reduced. But since it does not occur their welfare actually is
increased, and it is possible to exact a maximum amount from them
so they are as well off as if the change had actually occurred. Ervin
and Fitch compare the CV of the proponents with the EV of the
opponents.
The result of having a maximum amount coming from the proponents and a minimum amount going to the opponents is obtained
because it is assumed that under existing law no zoning change is
possible. That is, the proponents bribe the opponents to have the law
changed. If the opposite were true, i.e., a zoning change were possible under existing law, the situation would be reversed. Those who
favored a change would have to be bribed by those who were against
the change. Thus, the CV of the opponents is the maximum amount
they are willing to pay to have the law changed to block the proposal. The CV of the proponents is the minimum amount they are
willing to accept and live without the change. Once again, if the
maximum amount the opponents are willing to pay exceeds the minimum amount the proponents are willing to accept, a Pareto improvement is possible and no change in zoning should take place.
The CV approach is consistent with Pareto improvement calculations: one compares only the CVS of the proponents and opponents
which are exact measures of maintaining each individual's welfare at
its original level. Comparing the CV of the proponents with the EV
of the opponents under a no zoning change arrangement does not
6. This is the same situation as Ervin and Fitch use in their bidding scheme where the
zoning change is the event that has to be effected. Ervin & Fitch, supra note 1.
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achieve this, because the opponents' EV understates the actual loss
to the opponents if the zoning change occurred. This is true because
the minimum amount an opponent is willing to accept to put up
with a zoning change (his CV), is larger than the maximum amount
this opponent is willing to pay to maintain a no-change situation (his
EV). Ervin and Fitch start with a no zoning change arrangement,
under which they compute the proponents' willingness to pay. But
they change to a zoning change situation under which they compute
the opponents' willingness to pay. Both measures are CVs, but they
exist in different legal settings. That is, the opponents' EV under the
no zoning change setting is their CV under the setting which allows
the change, and both are maximum payments.
From this discussion it should be clear that the acceptance of the
existing law is crucial in the CV approach to measuring efficiency of
zoning changes. If the starting position is one of no zoning change,
the proponents compensate the opponents, but if the opposite starting position is accepted, the opponents compensate the proponents.
The question of who compensates whom involves issues of equity.
For example, if a law is permissive with respect to air pollution, then
those who suffer have to bribe the polluter to desist from polluting
the environment (i.e. change the law). If the law does not allow
pollution, the polluter has to bribe those who would suffer from it.
If the people who suffer from air pollution are poor and/or have
little political clout, their bribes would be insufficient to induce the
polluter to diminish or stop his polluting. Under the "polluterbribes" arrangement, i.e., the setting in which pollution is illegal, this
problem is circumvented because the poor can demand a minimum
amount which is independent of their ability to pay.
Ervin and Fitch mention the problem that the opponents could
easily outbid the proponents, thereby making sure that no zoning
change will occur, and the opponents would not have to run the risk
of losing their money. To circumvent this problem it is necessary to
devise other schemes that at least introduce the risk that the opponents can lose money. This, as Ervin and Fitch show, creates other
problems. One gets the impression that introduction of these risks
tries to achieve the same goal reached automatically under the
arrangement in which only the proponents can compensate the
opponents. This can be shown as follows. Under the Ervin-FitchWiseman scheme the proponents compensate the opponents if the
bids of the former exceed the bids of the latter. But, because the bids
of the opponents do not reflect the exact measure of their needed
compensation, there is an incentive for the opponents to overbid if
they do not have to compensate the proponents. If they have to
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compensate the proponents they will lower their bids, but then run
the risk of being "compensated" by the proponents without receiving the exact compensation they need.
None of these problems exist under the scheme proposed here, in
which the opponents state the exact amount of compensation they
are willing to accept, and the proponents the exact amount of compensation they are willing to pay. If the CV of the opponents is
larger than the CV of the proponents no zoning change will take
effect, no payments will be received or paid, and the existing no
zoning change situation is Pareto optimal. If the proponents are willing to pay more than the opponents are willing to accept, there
would be a zoning change and the excess money bid by those who
favor the zoning change would, after administrative costs are subtracted, either revert to the bidders or be distributed among the
receivers.
This scheme is straightforward and requires no second-guessing by
either proponents or opponents of their adversaries' bidding strategies. Still, one might argue that one or more opponent can demand
infinitely large amounts of compensation before they accept a zoning
change. This appears to be the equivalent of offering large sums of
money to prevent a zoning change under the Ervin-Fitch-Wiseman
scheme, when here were no risks involved in losing such sums. I use
"appears to be" because one should demand such infinite amounts
only when it is a true reflection of the value one places on the no
zoning change arrangement. On the other hand, offering large sums
of money to be able to torpedo a zoning change has nothing to do
with the actual value one places upon the no change arrangement
because-if no risk of payment is involved-one will neither lose nor
gain from making such offers. Furthermore, it makes good sense for
opponents to overbid, simply because the opponent cannot be
assured of getting exact compensation under the Ervin-FitchWiseman scheme. However, demanding an infinitely large amount of
money before one is willing to accept a zoning change will only
occur if one attaches a very high value to the existing situation under
the scheme proposed here. If such a situation holds, one must conclude that no zoning change should occur. It can be argued that such
an instance has a very small likelihood of occurring. Most individuals
will state a reasonable sum 7of money they are willing to accept to
put up with a zoning change.
7. This situation is akin to the value placed on one's life. If the existing legal arrangement
is such that a life cannot be taken then the value of one's life is the minimum amount one is
willing to accept for its rendering. This amount will be infinite if one is certain of one's
death within the next hour, but it becomes finite if there is only a very small probability
that somebody (including the individual in question) will die within the next hour.

NATURAL RESOURCESJOURNAL

[Vol. 20

The major problem associated with allowing bidding by the proponents of the zoning change is the occurrence of "free-riders." This
problem is recognized by Ervin and Fitch. As a possible solution,
they point out that meetings among the proponents can lead to
agreements as to what should be bid. Similar meetings can be held
among the opponents to prevent anyone demanding an infinitely
large amount of compensation, simply because he or she gets satisfaction out of torpedoing the zoning change. However, once meetings
and these agreements are involved in the ZA scheme, one enters into
the murky arena of bargaining and the possibly very expensive realm
of transaction costs. Particularly when many individuals with diverse
interests at stake are involved, meetings-not to speak of agreements-might become prohibitively expensive or even impossible to
accomplish.
The conclusion that can be drawn is that the problem with the ZA
approach to trading windfalls for wipe-outs does not lie in the bidding strategies of the proponents and opponents (as long as one
adheres to the CV approach), but rather in the transaction costs
incurred to record these bids. In other words, the main advantage of
the ZA-that all private interests can participate in the land use control decision-in practice also can be its major shortcoming.

